Abstract: We analyze preferences over redistribution in societies in which there are complementarities in income and agents use costly signals to sort themselves according to income. We characterize conditions over income distributions which imply that the median voter will prefer full redistribution to an environment in which he is able to match, at a cost, with agents with higher income. We relate these conditions to income inequality as well as to the properties of increasing or decreasing failure rates, which are commonly used to approximate real income distributions. When we consider only local changes, we illustrate how an "ends against the middle" coalition of voters might arise to increase the exclusiveness of sorting.
Introduction
Expensive private schools, large houses, charity donations, extravagant weddings and designer clothes, among others, have all been considered in the literature as ways in which individuals try to signal their wealth to others. 1 In environments in which there are complementarities in wealth, individuals have an incentive to use such tools in order to identify others'wealth.
Thus, beyond being a traditional tool for creating equality, policy instruments such as income or wealth redistribution have an additional e¤ect in such societies; they may reduce the incentive to signal as well as the occurrences of sorting.
Middle income groups may be particularly a¤ected by the pressure to signal. As inequality increases, such groups might be under increased incentive to interact with wealthier groups which may put a large strain on their budgets. In this paper we explore how this incentive to signal shapes individual preferences over redistributive policies and whether agents such as the median voter prefer a fully equal society or a society in which they can mix with the rich, but at a cost.
We analyze a simple model of linear redistributive taxation in which individuals have a utility that is supermodular in their own income and the income of the individuals they interact with.
Individuals match randomly with (and only with) those who acquire the same costly (and 1 The literature on conspicuous consumption includes contributions by Liebenstien (1950), Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) , Pesendorfer (1995) and He¤etz (2011) . Glazer and Konrad (1996) consider signalling of wealth via charitable donation which exhibits positive externalities. Moav and Neeman (2010) analyze the trade-o¤ between conspicuous consumption and human capital as signals for unobserved income and show why the poor spend a large share of their income on conspicuous consumption. wasteful) signal. In particular, we focus on a partition of the income distribution into a …nite number of groups or clubs which are determined by a set of costly signals and the respective incentive compatability constraints.
We characterize the relation between the income distribution function and the political viability of redistributive policies. We start by comparing societies with costly sorting to fully equal societies. For distributions for which the median income equals the mean, in the absence of sorting, the median voter has no strong preferences for taxation. We are then able to …nd a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the median and all those below to prefer full redistribution to any form of sorting. This condition is more likely to hold when the income distribution is relatively equal. In other words, when the median has no incentives for redistribution per se, such incentives arise in the presence of sorting when the underlying income distribution is su¢ ciently equal.
For skewed distributions for which the median income is less than the mean income, we focus on properties that relate to the hazard rate which are commonly used to approximate real income distributions. 2 When the distribution function satis…es a property called NBUE (which is satis…ed by any function with an increasing failure rate), any form of sorting is not politically viable compared with full equality. In particular, in this case all those with income below the mean income (and some with income above) prefer full equality to any combination of taxation and signaling. Moreover, we show that also for an open set of distributions with decreasing failure rate, any form of costly signalling or sorting is not politically viable. 3 The result illustrates that once the income distribution is skewed and the median has redistribution motives even in the absence of sorting, such incentives also arise in the presence of sorting when the income distribution is su¢ ciently equal and when it is su¢ ciently unequal.
We next analyze what happens when only small changes can be made to redistributive policies. We show that it is sometimes the case that the median voter and all those above prefer to reduce taxation. This arises if sorting is su¢ ciently inclusive, and if, again, society is su¢ ciently unequal. Finally, we consider policies that can a¤ect the exclusiveness of sorting, e.g., subsidies or taxes for private schools. We show how an "ends against the middle" coalition might arise in which the middle class faces opposition from both sides to increasing the inclusiveness of sorting and decreasing its price.
Our paper is in general related to the political economy literature on preferences over redistribution, such as Meltzer and Richards (1981) . While they highlight a channel that may de- 2 See for example Singh and Maddala (1976) and Salem and Mount (1974) . 3 "Sorting" and "signalling" have the same meaning in the model. crease the preferences for redistribution -e.g., tax distortions or reduction in labour incentiveswe highlight a channel that can increase the preferences for redistribution of agents above the median and sometimes even above the mean. This is consistent with the observation that along with poor individuals who vote to parties on the right, which had received much attention in the literature, 4 We discuss the relation of our results to theirs in more detail in Section 4. Several other papers focus on coarse matching, for example Hoppe, Moldovanu and Ozdenoren (forthcoming) and McAfee (2002) , and show the conditions under which coarse matching provides su¢ ciently high surplus compared with random or perfect matching. 5 We instead focus on the political viability of sorting compared with full equality. Following Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2009) and Hoppe, Moldovanu and Ozdenoren (forthcoming) we also rely on some results from reliability theory provided in Barlow and Proschan (1966) .
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on sorting in the tradition of Tiebut models, where agents who have di¤erent preferences over the provision of public goods sort themselves into communities which decide via majority rule on the level of such provision. 6 Within this literature several papers consider the e¤ect of redistributive policies. Fernandez and Rogerson (2003) consider provision of quality of schooling and analyze di¤erent equalizing policies which target the …nance of education. Epple and Romano (1998) model the supply side, i.e., the market for private schools, and show how more wealthy and able agents are screened into better quality schools. In this environment, they consider the policy of school vouchers and show that it is mainly high ability and high income types who bene…t from the introduction of vouchers to private schools. Fernandez and Gali (1997) analyze whether markets or tournaments produce a more e¢ cient outcome, and show that with credit constraints, markets perform less well than tournaments at sorting individuals according to ability. 7 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in the next 4 See for example Roemer (1998) . 5 See also Rege (2003) . 6 See Fernandez and Rogerson (2001) . 7 In a more complex environment, Benabou (1996) analyzes in a dynamic model the e¤ect of strati…cation on growth and e¢ ciency.
Section. In Section 3 we analyze conditions for the median to prefer full equality to all forms of …nite sorting for distributions for which the median equals the mean income. In Section 4 we establish conditions for more general distributions. Section 5 considers local preferences over more smooth taxation policies and over changing the exclusiveness of the club. An appendix contains all proofs not in the text.
The model
Suppose that agents di¤er in their income, x; which is distributed according to some F (x) and density f (x) (positive everywhere) on some [0; ]; 1: 8 Let (m) denote the mean (median) of the distribution. We will consider income distributions with m . Agents are matched with one another (a process which we will describe shortly); when two agents x and y meet, each enjoys u(x; y) = xy: We therefore assume complementarities in income, as in marriage or partnership markets or as in peer bene…ts from education (for which income can potentially induce a higher quality). 9 Note that for simplicity we focus on one dimension of heterogeneity. Our analysis can be generalized to consider two dimensional heterogeneity, of for example ability and income. 10 We consider a matching process in which agents might wish to signal their income to one another. Naturally, given the complementarities above, agents with high income would like to di¤erentiate themselves from the rest and match with one another and might therefore use costly signals to do so. When no signalling devices arise, matching is random. When some agents use a costly signal, they will match randomly with, and only with, all agents who use the same signal. Agents who do not acquire any signal are randomly matched with all others who do not acquire any signal. When an agent uses some signal that costs b; his utility will
where X b is the set of other agents who also use the costly signal b: The quasi-linear nature of the utility function is simple to use but is not necessary for our results; some of our results can be extended to the case in which the utility of an agent x i 2 X b who 8 The lower bound of the support is a normalization. Indeed, one example we discuss below is the Pareto distribution on [1; 1): 9 The analysis can be extended to other more generalized utility functions of the form h(x)g(y) exhibiting supermodularity with the conditions on F adjusted. We use a simple form of complementarity for tractability and in order to focus on the properties of F . See also Remark 1. 1 0 Note that in papers which take into consideration multidimensional heterogeneity, where for example agents di¤er in both ability and income, such as Fernandez and Rogerson (2003) or Epple and Romano (1998) , it is typically the case that a single crossing property is assumed which implies that agents sort themselves according to income.
matches with an agent
By single crossing, if some agent with x i prefers a signal b over b 0 ; all agents with x > x i will prefer b over b 0 : We will therefore focus on monotone sorting, i.e., with connected intervals. 11 We will abstract away from the supply side, i.e., how signals such as private schools or realestate prices are determined. 12 But as agents are assumed to choose optimally whether to acquire a costly signal, no matter how the supply side arises, the costs of the signals must satisfy some incentive compatability constraints. Suppose that there is only one such signal, where all agents above some cuto¤ x acquire this signal and pay b(x) and all below pay nothing.
The type at the cuto¤ x will be indi¤erent and hence the price of the signal must satisfy:
where
The expected utility of an individual x 0 < x is therefore x 0 E x and the expected utility of an individual x 0 > x can be written as:
Expected utility can be interpreted as the utility of the cuto¤ type, plus an information rent component that depends on the distance from the cuto¤. The utility from signalling is, as usual, increasing and convex in x 0 . More generally, below we de…ne the feasible signal partitions that we consider: 
1 1 If prices do not di¤er, we can sustain non monotone signalling structures for example when top and bottom agents use the same signal and middle agents use another signal, with the same expectations over income in both cases. For each individual, this is equivalent in expectations to all society being matched randomly and we will treat it as one signal. 1 2 For such analysis see Damiano and Li (2007) and Rayo (2005) .
Note that we are restricting the price of joining the lowest element in the partition to be zero.
As our results are mainly about showing when sorting is not politically viable this assumption strengthens our results.
For any FSP we can ask what are the preferences of the median voter for redistribution (the preferences of the median in our environment will be su¢ cient to represent a majority).
We will look at a simple linear taxation scheme in which the disposable income of an agent of type x is x(1 t) + t : The key premise that is built into the analysis is that when income inequality is reduced, so are the incentives to sort or the willingness to pay for sorting. As long as the absolute after-tax level of income has some e¤ect on the quality of the match or on the incentives to sort, our results will qualitatively hold.
For most of the paper we will consider the median voter's preferences for full redistribution (FR); the utility from full redistribution is 2 and is equal to all. Moreover, we will look at conditions on F for which the median will prefer FR irrespective of what the FSP is. That is, a condition that allows us to know that FR garners enough electoral support without any information of how society is divided into special clubs or what the tax is. 13 Note that in the absence of sorting, preferences over redistribution in the model are "standard": all agents up to the mean will prefer redistribution, and all those above will be against redistribution. In the presence of perfect sorting, the median is against sorting. In that case, all are matched with their own type but have to pay a price for it; thus, even the mean in the population would rather equalize income in society, in which case he also (trivially) matches with his own type but need not pay a price. 14 When sorting is coarse or discrete though, which is likely to be the case in reality, preferences are not as clear cut; discrete sorting will leave more rent to the agents. Thus, if there is any signalling structure that will be politically viable, it is more likely to be coarse which is why we focus on such structures.
A simple condition when no redistribution motive exists
Within coarse sorting, it is naturally the case that the poor who are left behind and do not belong to a "club", prefer FR as they can then match with better income types. The very 1 3 Our approach, i.e., considering a general family of sorting equilibria rather than focusing a particular one, allows us to pursue general results in environments in which we, the modelers, do not have a precise grasp of the supply side of the sorting market. A di¤erent approach is taken by Moav and Neeman (2010) who, in a related paper, focus on a re…nement of equilibria, the intuitive criterion. 1 4 Speci…cally, the cost of signaling for type x will be b(x) = x 2 =2 and so the type at that is indi¤erent is
rich might prefer sorting as their utility from this can outweigh the cost which is determined according to the IC constraint of a lower income type. But the middle classes'preferences are not obvious: on the one hand they can match with higher income types, whereas on the other hand the price for this compared with their willingness to pay is relatively high.
We …rst look at income distributions for which the mean income is equal to the median income. For such distributions, in the absence of signaling, the median has no strong preferences for or against redistribution. Therefore, any such preference will be driven by the e¤ects of signalling.
Consider …rst a simple FSP with n = 2 (i.e., just one cuto¤ x) and t = 0. Clearly, FR is preferred by the median if the cuto¤ x is such that x > m; i.e., when he does not belong to the club. FR in this case will increase both his utility and the utilities of those he interacts with.
We therefore have to focus on signals that satisfy x m: The median prefers full redistribution to any signal x i¤
Plug m = and divide by to get
then FR is preferred to coarse sorting for any x i¤:
It is easy to see that Condition 1 relates to income inequality: For any x; …xing ; if there is a higher weight on incomes below x then the condition is less likely to hold. Thus, any mean preserving spread of a distribution that does not satisfy the condition will not satisfy it as well, and any mean preserving contraction of a distribution which satis…es the condition will do so as well. As another illustration consider all distributions which are symmetric around the mean; all with density functions which are inverted U-shaped satisfy Condition 1 and all that have U-shaped functions satisfy it as long as they are not too concave (a necessary and su¢ cient condition being that f (0) < 1 ): Also, any shift in the distribution in a …rst order stochastic sense implies that the condition is more likely to hold. Thus, potentially, dynamics can play a role: Sorting is more likely to occur when the distribution is already unequal, which might increase inequality further in the long run.
Example 1: Consider the family of the symmetric beta distributions f (x) = 
Skewed distribution functions
We now consider more general distribution functions for which m : In the next result we use some traits of distribution functions that are borrowed from reliability theory. A function satis…es NBUE (new better than used in expectations) if
for any x and NWUE (new worse than used in expectations) if:
We then have:
Proposition 2 If the income distribution F satis…es NBUE then it satis…es condition 1.
Proof: Assume that E x x for any x: Using (1) we have that
for any x:
Thus, whenever the income distribution is NBUE, there is a coalition including the mean income and all those below, who would support full redistribution.
Remark 2: Proposition 2 is related to the (utilitarian) e¢ ciency of sorting. As we show in Proposition 6 in the Appendix, in our framework sorting leads to a higher (lower) average utility than full redistribution for any FSP if and only if the income distribution is NBUE (NWUE).
As the utility from sorting over x is convex, this also implies that whenever sorting is ine¢ cient, it is also not politically viable. Hall and Wellner (1984) showed that any NBUE function has a coe¢ cient of variation
1, whereas for any NWUE, CV (x) 1: Thus, under NBUE, the variability of the income distribution is too little and hence costly sorting is not e¢ cient. For the case of perfect continuous signalling, Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2009) show that CV (x) ( )1 is a su¢ cient and necessary condition for sorting to be e¢ cient (not e¢ cient). 15 Barlow and Proschan (1966) have shown that any function with a decreasing failure rate (DFR) -such as the exponential, Pareto, Weibull and Gamma (for shape parameter less than one)-is also NWUE, and any function with an increasing failure rate (IFR) -such as exponential, uniform, normal, Weibull and Gamma (for shape parameter greater than one)-is also NBUE; thus sorting is not politically viable when the distribution function is IFR.
Focusing on IFR/DFR distribution functions is a useful exercise as such distributions are commonly used in the empirical literature estimating income distribution functions. Salem and Mount (1974) have advocated a version of the Gamma distribution, which is IFR, where 1 5 Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009) look at the utility from random matching but at the aggregate this equals the utility from FR to the whole of society. For their discrete model which has incomplete information on a discrete set of types but perfect signalling, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for e¢ ciency (ine¢ ciency) of signalling is for the function to have decreasing (increasing) failure rate. 16 Other distributions which are considered in the literature are Pareto (which is DFR) and the Lognormal (which is …rst IFR and then DFR). Singh and Maddala (1976) claim that income distributions should be DFR at least for high enough income, as the ability to make more money should increase with one's income, once some threshold is reached. 17 To further examine the political viability of sorting, given Proposition 2 and the above, it will be instructive to focus on income distribution functions that are NWUE and for concreteness we focus on functions which are DFR.
First note that a tighter version of Condition 1 (whose proof is analogous, see the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix) will demand that x F (x) > m for all x < m: This condition implies that any FSP (and any t) is dominated for the median by random matching (which provides utility m ); which in turn is dominated by FR. 18 Note though that any DFR function is also concave and if F is su¢ ciently concave, it will surely violate x F (x) > m for small enough x: Also, as this condition does not take into account the pure or standard bene…ts of income redistribution, we need to specify a tighter condition.
Remember that we are looking for results that do not depend on the particular sorting structure. The following Lemma will be helpful in allowing us to focus on those FSP's that are most attractive to the median. that identi…es with x on [x i ; 1] but is …ner on the region [0; x i ): When F is concave, the utility of z is larger from x 0 and converges in the limit (when the partition below x i becomes perfectly 1 6 For this distribution the median is
is the parameter of skewness, and the mean is : For the decades of the 60's, their estimate of is around 2 and is around 0.03. 1 7 Singh and Maddala (196) …t the data to some mixture of Pareto and Weibull, with an increasing proportional hazard rate (x
) which then converges to become constant. We note that Cramer (1978) advocates caution with respect to interpreting failure rates properties with regard to income (where such properties should relate to time or age). 1 8 This condition is consistent with Proposition 7 in Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2009), which shows that if the distribution function is uniform or stochastically dominates the uniform, then all in society prefer random matching to (perfect) costly sorting. If F stochastically dominates the uniform distribution then F (x) < 
…ne) to
Whenever F is DFR, we can therefore focus on a set of "virtual" FSP's with one cuto¤
x < m; one element of the partition being [x; ] and perfect signals all the way to x: For any x; such a signalling structure provides the maximum utility for the median, which is (when t = 0):
Note that for the utility in (2) to be higher than FR, x has to be high enough; otherwise, for too small x; E x ! and the best the median can get from sorting approaches his utility from random matching. But also to provide information rent, x cannot be too high. We then …nd: Note that for all DFR's, m ln 2 0:69: 19 Thus condition (ii) above covers a large set of DFR's and in particular those that are relatively more concave or more unequal. In this case the information rent is simply too small for the median to gain enough utility in any sorting environment. Condition (iii) arises when f falls fast enough so that the hazard rate is low enough at x which again implies a high degree of concavity or income inequality. Intuitively, this implies that the utility from sorting decreases with x as only little is gained in terms of the expectations over the high income types above x when x increases, as f is already su¢ ciently ‡at. On the other hand if F is not su¢ ciently concave, and does not increase fast enough to rid of large weight on small values, E x will not increase quickly enough implying that it might be that x > m.
Note that the analysis conducted in Section 3 focused on an environment in which the median has no pure redistribution motive, in which case inequality implied that it is more likely that the median prefers sorting. Once redistribution motives are introduced, both a su¢ cient degree of inequality and a too little degree of inequality imply that the median is against sorting. The conditions together impose therefore quite tight restrictions and in fact we have not been able to …nd any example of a DFR function for which there is some sorting which is politically viable. The density is bimodal with most weight on the tales, and the mean and the median equal 1/2. For this distribution, we have that
F (x) for x small enough which implies that the mean and the median prefer signalling with such a cuto¤ x to FR; moreover, it is also e¢ cient.
An interesting point to note is that if a monopoly would choose x to maximize pro…ts (e.g., b(x)(1 F (x))); it would choose x = 0:5 and thus implementing this politically viable and e¢ cient FSP is not trivial.
5 Preferences for small reforms in redistribution and sorting.
As we have seen, for many income distribution functions, the median prefers to have a completely equal society rather than live in a society in which he has to pay to interact with high income types. We now consider two extensions, and focus on a simple FSP with n = 2 and one cuto¤ x: First, we consider local preferences over linear taxation and show that the median (and all those above) might prefer taxes to be reduced and income inequality to grow. This happens when the income distribution is su¢ ciently unequal. Second, there are other policy tools that might a¤ect the equilibrium in the signaling market; the government can introduce constraints or subsidies in the housing or education markets for example, which will a¤ect the price and composition of sorting. We will show that in this case an "ends against the middle" coalition can arise between high income types in the "club" (above x) and low income ones outside the club, to increase the exclusiveness of the club.
With regard to more smooth taxation policies, consider linear taxation where the income of an individual i is (1 t)x i + t : For some type x 0 > x; the utility from some cuto¤ x can therefore be written as
Taxation increases the utility of all agents who are not in the club, as long as x < . For agents in the club, it increases the base utility of the agent at the cuto¤, but decreases the gain from the information rent, and the income of those whom they are matched with. This implies that if the cuto¤ type is low enough, and taxation is low enough as well, the …rst positive e¤ect is small. Thus the median actually prefers to reduce it further as the second negative e¤ect dominates the …rst one:
Proposition 4: When local changes only are possible to taxation, then when the club is relatively inclusive and taxation is low enough, the median and all those above support reducing taxation. The median and all those below support an increase in taxation if it is su¢ ciently high already.
An implication of Proposition 4 is that the incentive for taxation can be lower under sorting than in its absence, if taxation is low enough and the club large enough, as in the absence of sorting the median always favours taxation. When taxation is already high enough, or society relatively equal, the negative e¤ect of taxation on the information rent is rather small and is outweighed by the positive e¤ect on the utility of the type at the cuto¤. In fact, the incentive to tax is then greater in the presence of sorting than in its absence. Once again, we see that inequality may lead to reduced taxation and hence more inequality whereas equality may lead to increased taxation and hence to more equality.
Next we analyze local preferences over x; will agents prefer the club to be more or less inclusive? For the poor who are not in the club, the higher is x the better is the average income for their match. For those in the club, the derivative of the utility from sorting is (for some type x 0 ) is:
An increase in x increases E x ; E x ; as well as the price. What is clear from (3) is that once x 0 prefers an increase in x; then all those above prefer an increase in x as well. This reveals a possible "ends against the middle" coalitions for small local changes.
Proposition 5: A coalition to increase x will always consist of agents below x and sometimes consists of all agents from some x 0 > x and above. Moreover, there exist income distri-butions for which an "ends against the middle" coalition can arise to successfully increase the exclusiveness of the club.
Policies that can increase or decrease x are subsidies or taxes imposed on the signalling devices; a fuller analysis will naturally include the cost of such tools. Still, the result above indicates who may gain and who may lose from such a policy. Below we show examples of such successful "ends against the middle"coalitions (consisting of more than 50% of the population but excluding the median): 
Discussion
Our analysis implies that when preferences for matching and signaling are taken into account, they can a¤ect preferences regarding taxation, and that in most cases, such preferences become stronger for the poorer majority of the population. In fact, we couldn't …nd an example with a DFR distribution in which the median voter preferred sorting to full equality. We have also shown how in some cases agents with income at the mean will strictly favour redistribution (when Condition 1 is strictly satis…ed as is the case with an IFR distribution). This is consistent with the observation that along with poor voters voting to the right, which had received much attention in the literature, there are also rich voters voting left. 20 Our result indicate that societies with more equal income distributions -and hence potentially higher median income- are less politically conducive for signalling, is also consistent with the observation that rich US states are more likely to vote Democrat even though rich voters overall are more likely to vote Republican. 21 We have made a few simplifying assumptions to facilitate our analysis. We analyze a simple signalling environment, which is one dimensional and characterized by a quasi-linear utility function. Our results can be extended to consider other utilities and more dimensions. We have provided general conditions for all forms of sorting, and a modelling of the supply side may provide more speci…c results. Most importantly, we have used a simple majority rule to assess the political viability of di¤erent policies. Clearly in some environments the median voter's preferences or those of the majority more generally are not su¢ cient to determine the political outcome. Organized lobbies which are more likely to represent organized high income voters or private providers of signals may bias the political outcome in their favour; these may imply that even if there are pressures for redistributions due to sorting, these are not necessary successful.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The necessary part follows from the case for one signal and t = 0. Note that with some tax level t; the condition becomes
and thus the condition for t = 0 is su¢ cient for any t > 0: This will also be the case for any FSP with n > 2 and thus we can set t = 0.
We now show su¢ ciency using an induction on the number of signals. We have already shown the su¢ ciency of the condition for n = 2: Suppose that the Proposition is true for any FSP with n = k 1: Consider all FSP with n = k: Again we will focus on the utility of m; as the utility of all the types below are lower (and all the types above are higher) from the FSP.
Note that if m < x 1 ; then his utility is like in an FSP with n = 2 and the same x 1 ; and so Condition 1 applies. If x 1 < m < x 2 ; consider his utility from an FSP with n = 3 and the same x 1 ; x 2 ; which is the same again. Thus if x i 3 < m < x i 2 for i k; his utility from the FSP is the same as the utility from an FSP with n = i and the same x 0 ; x 1 ; :::; x i 2 which by the induction hypothesis proves the result. Now assume that x k 2 < m < x k 1 : His expected utility can be written as:
which is strictly lower than the utility from an FSP with n = k 1 and the same x 0 ; x 1 ; :::; x k 2 in which case the last expectations are replaced by E(x j jx j 2 [x k 2 ; 1]) and the rest is the same.
Finally consider the case of m > x k 1 : We …rst divide and multiply his expected utility by m and then use Condition 1 repetitively:
This completes the proof.
Finally, note that when n = 2; when m = we have Condition 1 whereas an analogous and stronger condition which is derived in the same way for m < ; is when
m: This implies that m prefers random matching to any form of sorting. The proof for n > 2 will then also follow as above.
Su¢ ciency of Condition 1 for other utility functions:
We now show that condition 1 is also su¢ cient for the utility function (x b)(y b): Suppose there is just one signal. Then sorting is better than FR for the median/mean if
Note that at the cuto¤ x; we have that
This implies that the above holds if
For which, as b+ + Ex b+x+ Ex > 1; a su¢ cient condition is Condition 1.
Proof of Lemma 1: (i) Note that when we write the utility from a general FSP as in Proposition 1, utility trivially increases in the expectations over types that one meets and hence for any z 2 [x i ; x i+1 ] utility is highest when x i+1 = 1: (ii) Suppose that the partition is [0; x i ; x i+1 ; :::] and that z 2 [x i ; x i+1 ]: The utility of z is
Now suppose that the partition is [0; x i 1 ; x i ; x i+1 ; :::]: The utility of z is then:
The utility in (5) minus the utility in (4) is:
Or in other words, x F (x) being an increasing function which is the case when F is concave. The argument above can be extended to any region of the partition which we can make …ner and …ner below x i . Note that the cost of signals of intervals that converge to the point x converges to
Proof of Proposition 3: Given Lemma 1 we need to show that the conditions above imply:
for any x; as any other FSP which includes this x as a border of an interval will provide a lower utility. Note further that we need to focus only on x < m: To see condition (i) above note that if we plug E x 2 m then the above is lower than 2 whenever x < m. We therefore need m > x > x : To see condition (ii) note that for all x < m;
2 ), and hence the above decreases in x: At x = 0; the maximum utility from sorting at x is therefore 2m 2 i¤ m 1 2 : To see condition (iii), note that the derivative of 1 < 0 the derivative will be negative at x and will continue by DFR to be negative for all x implying the above. Extending all the above arguments to allow for some t > 0 is straightforward and the conditions identi…ed will be su¢ cient in this case as well.
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider expected utility from sorting for some type z > x:
(z x)(1 t)( E x (1 t) + t ) + (x(1 t) + t )((1 t)E x + t )
For some type z: The derivative w.r.t. t is:
(z x)( E x (1 t) + t ) + (z x)(1 t)( E x ) + ( x)((1 t)E x + t ) + (x(1 t) + t )( E x ) = (z x)((1 2t) 2 E x (1 t)) + ( x)((1 t)E x + t ) + (x(1 t) + t )(
Note that the …rst (negative) element decreases with t whereas the other elements increase with t so for any x; preferences for redistribution if positive at some point must increase afterwards, but can be negative at …rst. Consider …rst z = m = ; which implies that the only motive is sorting and not redistribution. At t = 0 the above is:
which implies that for low enough x; preferences are …rst decreasing. Around x = preferences are always positive. Around t close to 1:
so preferences for t must increase at the end. In that case, the e¤ect on the type that one meets is too low as well as the information rent.
If we add redistribution motive then note that the worst point is x = 0; t = 0: Then also for m < we have preferences against redistribution as it comes to E x + m 2m E x < 0 as E x < m: Of course if m is not in the club he likes redistribution and around t close to 1 we have as above.
Proposition 6: Compared with FR, sorting leads to a higher (lower) average utility for any
FSP i¤ F is NWUE (NBUE).
Proof of Proposition 6: Average utility from sorting for some FSP x can be written as
The average utility from full redistribution is:
note that
Suppose that n = 0: Then
, F is N BU E(N W U E)
Suppose that n = 1: Then:
Thus, for any n :
